| 基于信誉的技术联盟动态激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 朱少英. 基于信誉的技术联盟动态激励机制研究[J]. 山西大同大学学报(自然科学版), 2008, 24(1): 44-47 |
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| 作者姓名： | 朱少英 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]山西大同大学商学院,山西大同037009; [2]天津大学管理学院,天津300072 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对现有技术联盟激励机制“刚性”激励的缺陷,提出了技术联盟动态激励思想,通过构建数学模型,分析了动态激励合约对技术供给方的激励作用,得出的基本结论是：动态激励合约的激励强度优于“刚性”激励强度。
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| 关 键 词： | 技术联盟 动态激励 信誉机制 数学模型 |
Study on The Dynamic Stimulation Mechanism for Technology Alliance Based on Reputation |
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| ZHU Shao-ying. Study on The Dynamic Stimulation Mechanism for Technology Alliance Based on Reputation[J]. Journal of Shanxi Datong University(Natural Science Edition), 2008, 24(1): 44-47 |
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| Authors: | ZHU Shao-ying |
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| Affiliation: | ZHU Shao-ying ( 1. School of Commerce, Shanxi Datong University, Datong Shanxi, 037009; 2. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072) |
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| Abstract: | Based on game theory and information economics, this artice analyzes the limitation of the rigidity stimulation mecha- nism in traditional contracts, ahich restrains work power of technology suppliers. Then it puts forward idea of dynamic stimulation, constructs the mathematics model, and analyses that the dynamic stimulation contracts＇ incentive effect for technology suppliers. The conclusion is that dynamic stimulation is better than rigidity stimulation. |
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| Keywords: | technology-alliance dynamic stimulation reputation mechanism mathematics model |
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