| 风险投资的分段投资博弈模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈辉,张新立.风险投资的分段投资博弈模型分析[J].烟台大学学报(自然科学与工程版),2006,19(3):170-175,186. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈辉 张新立 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 烟台职业学院,山东,烟台,264003
2. 辽宁师范大学,数学学院,辽宁,大连,116021 |
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| 摘 要： | 在完全竞争的风险资本市场中，建立了由单个风险企业家与多个风险投资家组成的分段投资模型。分对称信息和非对称信息两种情形，推导出风险企业家和风险投资家的均衡收益及最优投资水平，给出了分段投资发生作用的条件．
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| 关 键 词： | 风险投资家 风险企业家 分段投资 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-8820（2006）03-0170-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-05-09 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-05-09 |
Game Analysis of Staged Financing in Venture Capital |
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| CHEN Hui,ZHANG Xin-li.Game Analysis of Staged Financing in Venture Capital[J].Journal of Yantai University(Natural Science and Engineering edirion),2006,19(3):170-175,186. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Hui ZHANG Xin-li |
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| Institution: | 1. Yantai Vocational College, Yantai 264003, China; 2. School of Mathematics, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian 116021, China |
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| Abstract: | A game model of staged financing is set up between an entrepreneur and several venture capitalists in competitive venture capital market. The model gives equilibrium return and the optimal investment level under symmetric information and asymmetric information, and identifies the condition under which staged financing is feasible. |
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| Keywords: | venture capitalist entrepreneur staged financing game |
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