| 委托-代理理论中的监督问题及其应用 |
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| 引用本文： | 范鹏飞,赵怀罡. 委托-代理理论中的监督问题及其应用[J]. 南京邮电大学学报(自然科学版), 2000, 20(4): 70-72 |
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| 作者姓名： | 范鹏飞 赵怀罡 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京邮电学院,邮政系,江苏,南京,210003 |
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| 摘 要： | 首先简要地介绍了经济学上的委托-代理理论,然后从委托人的角度出发,对委托-代理模型中的监督问题进行了研究,探讨了委托人为了获得更多有关代理人的信息所需花费的最优监督成本,并通过实例加以分析和应用.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理 数学模型 监督成本 最优效益 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1972(2000)04-0070-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-01-12 |
The Problem of Supervision in the Theory of Principal-Agent and Its Application |
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| FAN Peng-fei,ZHAO Huai-gang. The Problem of Supervision in the Theory of Principal-Agent and Its Application[J]. JJournal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, 2000, 20(4): 70-72 |
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| Authors: | FAN Peng-fei ZHAO Huai-gang |
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| Abstract: | This article introduces briefly the economic theory of principal-agent problems at first.Then,from the sight of principal,the author studies the problem of supervision about the principal-agent model,probes into the best cost of supervision that the principal should spend in order to own more information about agent,explains and uses the theory by some examples. |
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| Keywords: | Principal-agent Mathematical model Cost of supervision The best benefits |
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