| 不公平厌恶下供应链的批发价格契约与协调 |
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| 引用本文： | 毕功兵,瞿安民,梁樑. 不公平厌恶下供应链的批发价格契约与协调[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(1): 134-140. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2013)1-134 |
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| 作者姓名： | 毕功兵 瞿安民 梁樑 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国科学技术大学 管理学院, 合肥 230026 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70871106 ); 国家创新研究群体科学基金(70821001) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对传统的批发价格契约无法实现供应链协调, 探讨了在市场需求为不确定条件下, 不 公平厌恶对批发价格契约协调供应链的影响. 在零售商是不公平厌恶的假设下, 分别不 利不公平厌恶和有利不公平厌恶两种情况, 建立数学模型. 研究结果表明在有利不公平 厌恶下, 批发价格契约可以提高供应链的整体利润和更好地协调供应链, 从而延拓了传 统的批发价格契约协调供应链的理论, 有利于批发价格契约协调供应链的应用. 最后用算例验证了新结论.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链管理 批发价格契约 不公平厌恶 协调 |
| 收稿时间： | 2010-09-08 |
Supply chain coordination with wholesale price contract incorporating inequity aversion |
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| BI Gong-bing,QU An-min,LIANG Liang. Supply chain coordination with wholesale price contract incorporating inequity aversion[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2013, 33(1): 134-140. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2013)1-134 |
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| Authors: | BI Gong-bing QU An-min LIANG Liang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the problem that the traditional wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, the paper studies the effects that inequity aversion has on coordination of supply chain by wholesale price contract with uncertain demand. Based on inequity aversion retailer assumption, a mathematical model is formulated which takes into considerations advantageous inequity aversion and disadvantageous inequity aversion. The results show that the wholesale price contract can improve the profit of the whole chain and better coordinate the supply chain in advantageous inequity aversion case, which enrich the theory of the wholesale price contract and facilitate its application in real life. In the last part of this paper, a numerical example is used to prove the findings. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain management wholesale price contract inequity aversion coordination |
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