需求预测信息更新条件下供应链的三阶段期权协调机制

考虑需求信息更新条件下的供应链期权协调机制, 研究三阶段生产和订购模型: 零售商在第一阶段发出固定订单并购买期权; 然后在第一和第二阶段之间更新需求信息, 并在第二阶段对固定订购量和期权购买量分别进行调整; 第三阶段满足市场需求, 通过执行期权并在必要时启动紧急订购满足前两阶段固定订货不足的部分. 协调机制的参数包含两个期权购买价格、一个期权执行价格和紧急订购对应的批发价, 且后两者均是期权购买价格的二元隐函数. 算例分析结果表明: 供应链及其成员的利润都得到帕累托改进; 两个期权购买价格及其比例关系对零售商订购决策和系统利润增量分配有着敏感影响; 期权价格在第一阶段的下降和第二阶段的上升均会为制造商带来投机动力, 争取谈判优势是零售商的理性选择.

Three-stage supply chain coordination mechanisms with options under demand forecast information updating

This paper develops three-stage production and ordering models to discuss supply chain coordination mechanisms with options under demand information updating. At the first stage, the retailer makes decisions on fixed order and option quantities, and then at the second stage, which begins with demand information updating, the retailer respectively makes adjustments to them. In the third stage, the demand will be realized; if there is shortage, it will be satisfied first through exercising option contract and second by invoking an urgent order. The option contracts consist of two option prices, an exercise price, and a wholesale price under the urgent order. Both of the latter two can be expressed as binary implicit functions of the two option prices. We simulate the three-stage production and ordering mode with option contracts, and find that and both the system profit and the two members' profit have got Pareto improvement, and the option prices and the proportionality factor between them play an important role on decisions of ordering quantities and the allocation of the extra system profit. Moreover, both a smaller first-stage option price and a higher second-stage option price will bring motive for the manufacturer to speculate; to posses some negation power is the just rational choice of the retailer.