政府市场规制对企业绿色技术创新决策与绩效的影响

政府市场型规制较高的创新要素配置效率决定了其在促进企业绿色技术创新的优势.为此,对比分析了无市场规制+集中决策(情景1)、无市场规制+独立决策(情景2)、价格型规制+集中决策(情景3)、价格型规制+独立决策(情景4)、竞争型规制决策(情景5)下企业市场最优定价策略和绿色技术创新水平,并计算出了每种情形下的系统废弃物排放量、系统经济效益和系统消费者剩余.借助数值模拟的方法,分析了不同决策情景下,各外生变量对企业绿色技术创新努力水平与创新绩效的敏感性.研究结果表明,市场规制对企业绿色技术创新水平的影响同规制类型和博弈决策类型有关.集中决策情形下,系统废弃物排放量和消费者剩余会降低,系统经济收益增多;在市场规制下,系统经济收益和消费者剩余会升高;在集中决策下,市场规制会降低废弃物排放量,在独立决策下,市场规制会增加系统废弃物排放量,但是无论什么决策类型下,随着市场规制的引入,废弃物排放强度都是处于下降趋势;在竞争型规制决策情景下,系统废弃物排放量和系统经济效益均实现了最小化,但是社会福利达到了最大化.上述分析对于政府进一步优化市场化规制工具也有一定的借鉴意义.

Impact of market regulations on decision-making and performance of enterprises' green technological innovation

The allocation efficiency of high innovation elements in government's market-oriented regulation brings superiority of promoting enterprises' green technological innovation. This paper compares and analyses the optimal pricing strategy and green technological innovation level of enterprise under non-market regulation + centralized decision-making (scenario 1), non-market regulation + independent decision-making (scenario 2), price regulation + centralized decision-making (scenario 3), price regulation + independent decision-making (scenario 4), command regulation decision-making (scenario 5). The system waste discharge, system economic benefit and system consumer surplus in each scenario are calculated. By means of numerical simulation, the sensitivity of exogenous variables to enterprise green technological innovation level and innovation performance under different decision-making scenarios is analyzed. The results show that the impact of market regulation on the level of green technological innovation of enterprises is related to the types of regulation and game decision-making. In the case of centralized decision-making, system waste emissions and consumer surplus will decrease, while system economic benefits will increase; in the case of market regulation, system economic benefits and consumer surplus will increase; in the case of centralized decision-making, market regulation will reduce waste emissions, and in the case of independent decision-making, market regulation will increase system waste. Under any decision-making type, however, with the introduction of market regulation, the intensity of waste emission is in a downward trend; under the competitive regulation decision-making scenario, system waste emissions and system economic benefits are minimized, but social welfare is maximized. It has a certain reference significance for the government to further optimize market regulation tools.