零售商投贷联动融资的供应链契约结构分析

投贷联动融资是经济新常态背景下增强金融服务实体经济的能力和意愿的重要命题,选择合理的供应链契约结构则是促进金融资本与供应链深度融合及防范金融系统风险的重要措施.本文刻画了股权资本重构融资企业信用与产融结合的新特征,构建了零售商投贷联动融资下批发价(收益共享)契约模型,探讨了供应链契约结构的选择机制及对供应链运营效率改善空间.核心研究发现是投贷联动融资的供应链契约结构选择取决于交易成本降低(协同效益)与供应链协同成本的比较.此外,收益共享契约下投贷联动融资能协同供应链成员与金融机构实现帕累托改进,且存在贷款利率与努力成本扰动风险倒挂现象.

Contract structure analysis of supply chain under retailer's investment and loan linkage financing

In new normal period, investment and loan linkage financing plays an significance proposition to enhance the ability and willingness of financial institutions to serve the real economy. Reasonable supply chain contract structure is a fundamental measure to promote the deep integration of financial capital and supply chain, and to prevent risks in the financial system. This paper depicts the new characteristics of enterprise credit reconstruction and operation decision transfer, established a wholesale price (revenue sharing) contract model under the retailer's investment and loan linkage financing and explore the selection mechanism of contract structure and efficiency improvement space. The key finding is that the chosen mechanism of supply chain contract structure depends on the comparison of transaction cost reduction (synergistic benefit) and supply chain cost in investment and loan linkage financing. In addition, the revenue sharing contract could coordinate supply chain members and financial institutions to achieve Pareto improvement, and there is a upside down phenomenon between interest rate and effort cost disturbance risk.