渠道权力结构与责任成本分担下供应链质量及协调研究

责任成本分担合同已被供应链企业广泛采纳以降低产品安全事故.基于此,构建了一个由制造商与零售商组成的供应链博弈模型,在三种渠道权力结构下,研究了责任成本分担对制造商产品质量决策等的影响,并考察了渠道权力结构对供应链均衡结果及契约协调的影响.结果表明:若制造商为领导者,则其责任成本分担的增加不影响其产品质量与供应链企业利润,反之,将促进其产品质量与供应链企业利润的增加;制造商为领导者时的产品质量可达到供应链系统最优;领导权力可使制造商获得较大利润,但对零售商不一定适用;制造商为领导者时可通过零售商收益分享与制造商转移支付实现协调,反之,可通过一个相同的由制造商收益分享与零售商质量成本分担、转移支付构成的组合契约实现协调.

The research on quality and coordination in supply chains under channel power structures and liability cost sharing

The liability cost sharing contract has been widely used by the firms in supply chains to avoid the occurrence of a product safety incident. In view of it, by considering a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies the impacts of the liability cost sharing on the manufacturer's quality decisions under three different channel power structures, and then investigates the impacts of channel power structures on the equilibrium results and coordinations. The results show that: an increase in the share of the liability cost allocated to the manufacturer has no impact on the product quality level and the profitability for each supply chain member if the manufacturer is the leader of supply chain, but leads to a higher product quality level and higher profits for both supply chain members if the manufacturer's leader position is lost; the quality level of the product reaches the first-best level of the supply chain system if the manufacturer is the leader; the manufacturer, instead of the retailer, can benefit from its relatively higher channel power; when the manufacturer has a relatively higher channel power, a scheme combining a retailer's revenue sharing contract and a manufacturer's transfer payment contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain, otherwise, the decentralized supply chain can be coordinated by a same scheme which consists of a manufacturer's revenue sharing contract, a retailer's quality cost sharing contract, and a retailer's transfer payment contract.