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技术链视角下产业共性技术供给模式选择研究
引用本文:郑月龙,任毅.技术链视角下产业共性技术供给模式选择研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2020,40(4):915-932.
作者姓名:郑月龙  任毅
作者单位:1. 重庆工商大学 废油资源化技术与装配教育部工程研究中心, 重庆 400067;2. 电子科技大学 经济与管理学院, 成都 611731;3. 重庆工商大学 长江上游经济研究中心, 重庆 400067
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630266);重庆市自然科学基金(基础研究与前沿探索专项)面上项目(cstc2019jcyj-msxmX0112);2018年重庆市社会科学规划项目(2018PY64);2019年重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究一般项目(19SKGH086)
摘    要:结合共性技术研发过程及技术链分析,借鉴Stackelberg博弈思想,通过引入纵向扩散难度、技术弹性及后续开发难度等建立主从博弈模型,分析了技术链视角下共性技术供给模式及选择问题.研究发现相对政府主导和政府-市场结合模式言,市场主导模式不可取;随供给成功率增加率增大、纵向扩散难度减少、技术弹性增加(只要纵向扩散难度不太大或供给成功率增加率不太小)及上游企业影响力增加(相应政府-市场结合模式下下游企业预期收益低于政府主导模式),政府-市场结合模式上下游企业努力水平及博弈参与方预期收益均高于政府主导模式,且下游企业努力水平及收益均更晚的超过政府主导模式,反之,政府主导供给模式占优.最后,讨论了研究的管理启示.

关 键 词:技术链  共性技术  供给模式  STACKELBERG博弈  比较
收稿时间:2018-11-15

Study on the supply mode selection of generic technology from the technology chain perspective
ZHENG Yuelong,REN Yi.Study on the supply mode selection of generic technology from the technology chain perspective[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2020,40(4):915-932.
Authors:ZHENG Yuelong  REN Yi
Institution:1. Engineering Research Center for Waste Oil Recovery Technology and Equipment of Ministry of Education, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;2. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China;3. Research Center for the Economy of the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
Abstract:Combining the analysis of generic technology R&D process and its technology chain, learning from the Stackelberg's game theory, a game model is established by introducing such parameters as vertical diffusion difficulty, technical elasticity and subsequent development difficulty. This paper analyzes the generic technology supply mode and its selection problem considering diffusion process from technology chain perspective. The results show that compared with the government-led model and the government-market integration model, the market-led model is not desirable. Specifically, with the increase of the success rate of supply, the decrease of the difficulty of vertical diffusion, the increase of technical elasticity (as long as the difficulty of vertical diffusion is not too great and the success rate of supply is not too small) and the increase of the influence of upstream enterprises (the expected return of downstream enterprises under the corresponding government-market combination mode is lower than that under the government-led mode), the level of upstream and downstream enterprises' efforts and the expected returns of game participants under the government-market integration model are higher than those under the government-led model, and the level of effort and returns of downstream enterprises are later than those of upstream enterprises. Otherwise the government-led supply mode is more dominant. Finally, the management enlightenments are disscussed for the issue of promoting generic technology supply and mode selection.
Keywords:technology chain  generic technology  supply mode  Stackelberg game  selection  
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