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公平视角下的国企高管薪酬水平——仿真测算与比较
引用本文:梁峰,刘扬,张小红. 公平视角下的国企高管薪酬水平——仿真测算与比较[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(2): 382-391. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-1609-10
作者姓名:梁峰  刘扬  张小红
作者单位:1. 北京石油化工学院 经济管理学院, 北京 102600;2. 中央财经大学 统计与数学学院, 北京 100081
基金项目:北京市社科基金(15JGC175);长城学者培养计划项目(CIT&TCD20180314);教育部人文社科基金(19YJA790052)
摘    要:为讨论我国国企高管薪酬设置的公平性,提出一种能够实现基尼系数与收入分布之间转换的洛伦茨曲线表达式.基于该洛伦茨曲线,通过仿真测算了企业内部薪酬差距基尼系数经验"警戒线"对应的国企高管薪酬水平,并将测算结果与国有控股上市公司高管的实际薪酬对比.仿真结果表明,薪酬差距基尼系数的经验"警戒线"所对应的高管最高薪酬约为企业平均薪酬的3~4倍.比较2010-2016年的薪酬数据,我国国有控股上市公司高管最高薪酬与企业平均薪酬比值的均值介于3.9~7.1倍,表明国企内部初次分配收入差距较大,2015年政府限定央企高管薪酬不超过企业平均薪酬的7~8倍仍是宽松的约束.仿真测算结果可为我国薪酬规制政策力度的选择提供数量参考.

关 键 词:国企改革  高管薪酬  薪酬差距  洛伦茨曲线
收稿时间:2018-08-17

The parity of executive compensation in the Chinese state-owned enterprises-An evidence from simulated comparison
LIANG Feng,LIU Yang,ZHANG Xiaohong. The parity of executive compensation in the Chinese state-owned enterprises-An evidence from simulated comparison[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(2): 382-391. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-1609-10
Authors:LIANG Feng  LIU Yang  ZHANG Xiaohong
Affiliation:1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Institute of Petro-Chemical Technology, Beijing 102600, China;2. School of Statistics and Mathematics, Central University of Economics and Finance, Beijing 100081, China
Abstract:To investigate the parity of executive compensation contracted in the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), an expression form of the Lorenz curve is proposed, which makes the transformation between the Gini index and income distribution available. Based on the Lorenz curve, the executive compensation corresponding to the empirical "warning line" of the Gini index is estimated by numerical simulation and then compared with the actual data. The simulated result indicates that the highest executive compensation in SOEs should fall within 3 to 4 times of average employee compensation. By contrast, from 2010 to 2016, the actual executive compensation in the listed SOEs is 3.9 to 7.1 times of their employee average compensation, which implicated a considerable wage inequality existed in the SOEs, and the regulation that executive compensation of central government controlled SOEs should not exceed 7 to 8 times of employee average compensation is a loose restriction. The compensation range from simulation could provide a quantitative reference for the regulation policy of the SOEs executive compensation.
Keywords:state-owned enterprises reform  executive compensation  compensation disparity  Lorenz curves  
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