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不同环境规制下企业废旧产品回收的动态决策研究
引用本文:汪明月,李颖明,史文强,郝亮,全水萍. 不同环境规制下企业废旧产品回收的动态决策研究[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 40(1): 103-118. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0657-16
作者姓名:汪明月  李颖明  史文强  郝亮  全水萍
作者单位:1. 中国科学院 科技战略咨询研究院, 北京 100190;2. 中国科学院大学 公共政策与管理学院, 北京 100049;3. 北京理工大学 管理与经济学院, 北京 100081;4. 生态环境部 环境与经济政策研究中心, 北京 100029
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71473241,71473242);国家重点研发计划"全球变化及应对"重点专项(2016YFA0602500);国家自然科学基金委应急管理项目(71741017)
摘    要:制定科学可行的政策措施是促进企业废旧产品回收再利用的重要手段.在经典博弈论的基础上,充分考虑声誉对企业绩效的正向影响,并将时间因素引入分析模型中,构建了以制造商为主导的动态Stackelberg博弈模型.用该模型系统分析了无约束条件下、奖励条件下、惩罚条件下及奖惩条件下制造商废旧产品回收量、废旧产品回收率、制造商和零售量的利润、制造商的声誉、供应链系统利润,探索了每种政策措施的适用条件及绩效.研究发现,企业具有明显的趋利避害的属性,对于不同政策具有不同的适应时间;企业进行绿色技术创新能够有效地改善其经济绩效和环境绩效;惩罚和奖惩机制在提高回收率(量)和企业声誉的同时,却降低了不同主体与系统的利润;奖励机制对各类要素的作用是正向的,但是需要政府资金支持;奖惩机制的效用大小与政府规定的废旧产品回收率有关.在上述研究结论的基础上,给出了相应的政策建议,以期为绿色转型发展提供相关的理论支撑.

关 键 词:环境规制  废旧产品回收  Stackelberg博弈  动态决策
收稿时间:2018-04-28

The dynamic analysis and simulation of different government regulations in product-recovery supply chain
WANG Mingyue,LI Yingming,SHI Wenqiang,HAO Liang,QUAN Shuiping. The dynamic analysis and simulation of different government regulations in product-recovery supply chain[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2020, 40(1): 103-118. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788-2018-0657-16
Authors:WANG Mingyue  LI Yingming  SHI Wenqiang  HAO Liang  QUAN Shuiping
Affiliation:1. Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;2. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China;4. Policy Research Centre for Environmental and Economic, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Beijing 100029, China
Abstract:Scientifically policy are important measures to promote recycling and reuse of used products. Based on classical game theory, the positive influence of reputation on firm performance was fully considered, and the time factor was also introduced into the analysis model, thus a dynamic Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturers was constructed. The model was used to compare and analyze the amount of manufacturer's recycling of used products, recycling rate of used products, profit of manufacturers and retail sales, reputation of manufacturers, profit of supply chain system, under the unconstrained conditions, reward conditions, punishment conditions, and rewards-punishments conditions, respectively. The applicable conditions and effects of each policy measure were explored. The study finds that enterprises have obvious characteristics of seeking benefits and avoiding disadvantages, and have different adaptation time for different policies. Enterprises' green technology innovation can effectively improve their economic performance and environmental performance; punishment and reward-punishment mechanisms increase recovery rate (amount), at the same time as corporate reputation, while it may also lower the profits of different agents and systems. The role of incentive mechanisms is positive, but it requires government funds support; the effectiveness of rewards-punishments mechanism is related to the rate of recovery of used products prescribed by the government. Based on the above conclusions, the specific policy recommendations are given to provide relevant theoretical support for the coordinated development of the green transformation.
Keywords:environmental regulation  used product recycling  Stackelberg game  dynamic decision  
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