授权分销商与灰色市场投机者的Stackelberg竞争分析

本文针对现有文献忽略了授权分销商与灰色市场投机者的市场力量差异的研究现状,考虑由一个制造商和两个处于不同国家市场的分销商组成的跨国供应链(其中一个分销商参与灰色市场投机),构建了以授权分销商为领导者和以灰色市场投机者为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型.首先给出了批发价格合同下各节点企业的均衡策略,分析发现:与授权分销商和灰色市场投机者同时决策情形相比,i)授权分销商在其与灰色市场投机者序贯决策时能获得更高的利润;ii)制造商在二者序贯决策情形下能获得较高的利润;iii)授权分销商先决策可以降低灰市产品的销量和灰色市场投机者的投机利润.然后引入两部定价合同,并通过设定合理参数以实现供应链中各节点企业的帕累托改进.

Analysis of Stackelberg competition between the authorized and unauthorized distributors

In view of the common problem that the existing studies pay little attention to the different market powers of the authorized and unauthorized distributors, we consider a global supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two distributors in different countries, and we assume that one of the distributors will be the gray market entrant. The paper constructs a Stackelberg model where the authorized distributor is the leader and the unauthorized distributor is the follower. Firstly, the paper derives equilibrium strategies. We find that, in a gray market, the authorized distributor can obtain a higher profit in a sequential-decision setting, as compared to the simultaneous-decision setting. We derive that the manufacturer can obtain a higher profit in a sequential-decision setting, as compared to the simultaneous-decision setting. We also demonstrate that the sales volume of gray-market goods and profit from selling gray-market goods will be decreased when the authorized distributor makes decision first. Finally, we show that the node enterprises can achieve Pareto improvement by setting reasonable parameters in the two-part tariff contract.