首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

双向搭便车时双渠道供应链定价与销售努力决策
引用本文:李建斌,朱梦萍,戴宾.双向搭便车时双渠道供应链定价与销售努力决策[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(12):3046-3058.
作者姓名:李建斌  朱梦萍  戴宾
作者单位:1. 华中科技大学 管理学院, 武汉 430074;2. 武汉大学 经济与管理学院, 武汉 430072
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71171088,71301122,71571079);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-13-0228)
摘    要:考虑由制造商、网络零售商和实体零售商组成的双渠道供应链,在零售商之间存在价格竞争和双向搭便车的情形下,研究集成和分散供应链两种模式下最优定价和努力水平决策.研究发现,在集成供应链模式下,最优零售价格和销售努力水平只取决于努力成本,当努力成本低于某临界值时,网络和实体零售商都努力,否则,都不努力.在分散供应链中,努力水平与批发价格,努力成本以及搭便车系数有关:当努力成本过低与过高时,制造商设定同样的批发价格,零售商会分别选择同时努力和同时不努力,则努力水平和供应链利润与搭便车系数无关,否则,制造商实行批发价格歧视策略,且搭便车系数越大,价格歧视越明显,此时,随着搭便车系数的增大,制造商的利润减少,零售商的利润增大,供应链的利润增大.

关 键 词:双渠道  定价  销售努力  双向搭便车  
收稿时间:2015-06-17

Optimal pricing and sales effort decisions in a dual-channel supply chain in case of bidirectional free riding
LI Jianbin,ZHU Mengping,DAI Bin.Optimal pricing and sales effort decisions in a dual-channel supply chain in case of bidirectional free riding[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2016,36(12):3046-3058.
Authors:LI Jianbin  ZHU Mengping  DAI Bin
Institution:1. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China;2. Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
Abstract:In a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, an e-tailer and a brick-and-mortar retailer with bidirectional free riding and price competition, we study the optimal pricing and sales effort decisions under centralized and decentralized supply chains. We find that in the centralized supply chain, the optimal retail price and sales effort are only dependent on the effort cost. Both retailers take efforts only if the cost is lower than a certain threshold. Otherwise, neither retailer takes effort. In the decentralized supply chain, retailers' optimal sales effort depends on wholesale price, effort cost and the coefficient of free riding. In details, with a high or low enough cost, the manufacturer offers the same wholesale price to both retailers so that both retailers take effort or neither one takes effort. Consequently, the sales effort level and supply chain profit are independent with the coefficient of free riding. Otherwise, the manufacturer executes wholesale price discrimination which strengthens with the coefficient of free riding. In addition, the manufacturer's profit decreases with the coefficient of free riding, while the profit of the retailer and the supply chain increases.
Keywords:dual-channel  pricing  sales effort  bidirectional free riding  
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号