供应商部分信用担保下的存货质押融资决策

根据供应商担保能提高中小企业信用水平、缓解融资难题的特点，首先建立了加入部分信用担保契约的存货质押融资Stackelberg博弈模型，分析了各主体的最优决策；然后对不同担保比例下的银行利率进行了研究；最后通过算例验证了所得理论成果。研究结果表明：银行质押率随供应商担保比例的增加而增加，随零售商初始质押量的增加而减小。本文研究结果可为银行和供应链各方的决策提供参考。

Stock pledge financing decisions subject to partial credit guarantees by suppliers

Guarantees by suppliers improve the credit level of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), make it easier for SMEs to solve financing problems, and also increase the sales of their own products. In this study, several credit guarantee contracts were added to the inventory pledge financing model. We then established a Stackelberg game model of inventory pledged financing that is part of the credit guarantee contract. The optimal decision-making for each subject under this model was obtained. The effect of varying the initial pledge volume of retailers and the guarantee factor of the supplier on the pledge ratio were studied for different bank interest rates. In addition, different guarantee ratios were studied. Our results show that when only considering the relationship between one factor and the pledge ratio, the bank pledge ratio increases with the increase of the proportion of suppliers' guarantee, and the bank pledge ratio decreases as the initial pledge volume of retailers increases. Finally, we conducted several case studies to confirm our findings. Our research makes a valuable contribution to improving bank and supply chain party decision-making.