区域差距与两级政府公共教育分担的博弈分析

在代际交叠模型的基础上,构建了分权体制下中央和区域政府公共教育投入的动态博弈模型,探讨了存在区域不平衡情形下两级政府公共教育投入分担及其对区域差距演变的影响.分析显示,中央政府是否应进行公共教育投入依赖于区域差距的程度,但二者并不呈单调正相关关系,同时导出并分析了在区域差距程度的不同范围下中央和区域政府的均衡教育投入分担,并进一步据此探讨了差距的演变趋势.最后,结合我国实际,讨论了政策含义.

A game-theoretic analysis of regional disparity and public education financing of two-level governments

This paper studies the education policy choices in a decentralized economy with two levels of governments and regional income disparity. We employ a dynamic game model incorporating overlapping generations to analyze the optimal education spending of the central and local governments, and the subsequent effects of such financing arrangements on the dynamics of regional income distribution. We show that, whether the central government should provide public education and what level should be provided would depend on the extent of regional disparity. Only when the disparity is large could the provision of public education by the central government improve social welfare and reduce regional disparity over time. The optimal education expenditure of central government, however, does not monotonically increase with the extent of regional disparity. Finally, policy implications for China are discussed.