休耕地管护中利益主体的博弈分析

休耕地管护是休耕制度的重要内容,通过分析不同休耕地管护主体的利益诉求,建立完全信息静态博弈模型,协调各主体间的利益关系,可以为优化休耕地管护政策献计献策.研究结果表明:地方政府、管护方、农民之间的博弈均衡取决于休耕管护收益、机会成本、罚金等参数的大小比较;这些参数的大小受中央及地方政府政策执行力度以及管护方和农民管护意识的影响.提高休耕管护的质量应建立更加完善的休耕地管护监管制度;积极引导农民参与休耕地管护工作;建立管护方与休耕地的直接联系.

Game Analysis of Interest Subject on Profits in Management of Fallow

Fallow and protecting is the important content of fallow system. In this paper, the interests of different fallow have been analyzed, the complete information static game model been established, and their interests been coordinated in order to propose some countermeasures for optimizing fallow and protecting policy. The results show that the game equilibrium between local government, the protecting side and the farmer depends on the comparison of the parameters of the fallow, the opportunity cost, the fine and so on. The value of these parameters is influenced by the enforcement of center and local government policies and the awareness of protecting and protecting the farmers. To improve the quality of the fallow management, we should establish a more perfect fallow supervision system, actively guide farmers to participate in the fallow management work, and strengthen the direct connection between the farmland of the management unit.