基于不同竞争方式的企业兼并与技术授权的策略选择

在具有质量差异的双寡头伯川德竞争模型中,考察非生产性研发企业转让降低成本的技术,分析技术授权与兼并的选择,比较不同竞争方式对技术授权策略的影响.研究表明:非生产性研发企业总是偏好与高质量生产企业兼并;双重收费的技术授权取决于产品质量差异及技术革新程度,但可能恶化社会福利;如果兼并被允许,则在技术革新程度较小时选择技术授权,否则选择兼并对研发企业有利;不同竞争方式对非生产性研发企业的技术转让产生不同的影响,因此在技术转让中除考虑技术授权与兼并的选择,还要考虑竞争方式的影响.

Strategic Choices Between Enterprise Merging and Technology Licensing:Based on Different Competition Modes

By setting up a duopoly Bertrand competition mode with quality differences， the cost-reducing technology for transferring non-productive R & D firms was explored， the technology licensing and merging was analyzed， and the effects of different competition modes were studied. The results showed that non-productive R & D firms prefer a merger with high quality enterprises， and the licensing depends on the differentiation of goods quality and the degree of technology innovation in the two-part tariff， which may in turn deteriorate social welfare. In the case of minor innovation， R&D firms are supposed to opt for technology licensing; otherwise， they should choose merging. Different competition modes tend to exert varied effects on the technology transfer of non-productive R&D firms; therefore， a strategy should be adopted that takes into account licensing， merging and competition modes.