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非对称信息条件下公司配股公告效应
引用本文:杨俊 吴健中. 非对称信息条件下公司配股公告效应[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 1998, 32(3): 26-29
作者姓名:杨俊 吴健中
作者单位:上海交通大学系统工程研究所
摘    要:研究了存在内幕交易情况下上市公司配股的公告效应,并给出了相应的信号模型.从理论上导出,配股的公告效应取决于公司投资机会,对成长型公司、成熟型公司和衰退型公司,配股公告效应分别为正、中性、负.

关 键 词:金融;配股;公告效应;非对称信息

On Announcement Effect of Shares Rationing under Asymmetric Information
Yang Jun,Wu Jianzhong. On Announcement Effect of Shares Rationing under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 1998, 32(3): 26-29
Authors:Yang Jun  Wu Jianzhong
Abstract:The announcement effect, reaction of securities prices to corporate announcements, of shares rationing is studied and its signaling model is presented. The implication is that the announcement effect of shares rationing depends on the firm's investment opportunities. For the growth, mature or declining firms, the announcement effect of an increase in shares rationing is positive, neutral or negative respectively.
Keywords:finance  shares rationing  announcement effects  asymmetric information  
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