Stackelberg博弈模型的电力系统可靠性网络安全保险策略

为了评估网络风险并且长期规划保险费用,提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈模型的电力系统可靠性网络安全保险策略。首先引入Stackelberg安全博弈模型,并将该模型作为在每个半马尔可夫过程中跨目标变电站分配防御资源的最佳随机分配机制。然后采用序贯蒙特卡罗模拟方法对潜在网络攻击入侵造成的损失进行了可靠性分析,提出了第三方保险公司的精算保险原则,从而评估网络安全威胁造成的潜在供电中断的影响,并将脆弱性指标纳入长期可靠性评估。最后通过案例结果分析可知提出的保险策略有效地解决了不同电力公司损失的依赖性问题,并且能够有效处理安全投资与保险费节约之间的关系。

Power System Reliability Network Security Insurance Strategy Based on Stackelberg Game Model

To evaluate the network risk and plan the insurance cost for a long time, a network security insurance strategy for power system reliability based on Stackelberg game model was proposed. Firstly, the Stackelberg security game model was introduced and used as the best random allocation mechanism for allocating defense resources across target substations in each semi Markov process. Then the sequential Monte Carlo simulation method was used to analyze the reliability of the losses caused by potential network attacks and intrusions, and the actuarial insurance principle of the third-party insurance company was proposed to evaluate the impact of potential power supply interruption caused by network security threats, and the vulnerability index was included in the long-term reliability evaluation. Finally, through the analysis of case results, it can be seen that the proposed insurance principle can effectively solve the dependence of losses of different power companies, and can effectively deal with the relationship between safety investment and insurance premium saving.