多目标协调均衡的项目公司与承包商收益激励模型

从项目公司和承包商双层角度，应用激励理论瘦委托代理模型建立了项目公司与承包商之间的多目标协调均衡收益激励模型．并应用一阶条件方法进行了求解。结果表明，在固定总价合同下，从多目标角度实施协调激励，不仅可以实现双方收益的帕累托改善，防范承包商的道德风险；而且通过提供均衡的激励组合策略，可以使得承包商在多目标控制上提高并合理分配自己的努力水平或资源，从而实现项目多控制目标之间的协调均衡改善。模型算例分析也验证了模型的有效性。

A Revenue Incentive Model of Multi-objects Coordination Equilibrium between Project Corporations and Contractors

Based on the incentive theory and principal agent model, a revenue incentive model of multi-objects coordination equilibrium between Project Corporation and contractor was presented and solved through the first-order approach. The result shows that, in condition of fixed price contract, coordination incentive of multi-objects can not only actualize Pareto improvement of the two contracting sides and prevent moral hazard of the contractor, but also can promote the contractor to improve its efforts and to allocate its resources rationally in multi-objects so as to realize coordination equilibrium improvement among the multi-objects through providing a balanced incentive combination. Finally, a numerical study testified validity of the model.