Predictivism and the periodic table |
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Authors: | Stephen G. Brush |
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Affiliation: | aDepartment of History and Institute for Physical Science & Technology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA |
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Abstract: | This is a comment on the paper by Barnes (2005) and the responses from Scerri (2005) and Worrall (2005), debating the thesis (‘predictivism’) that a fact successfully predicted by a theory is stronger evidence than a similar fact known before the prediction was made. Since Barnes and Scerri both use evidence presented in my paper on Mendeleev’s periodic law (Brush, 1996) to support their views, I reiterate my own position on predictivism. I do not argue for or against predictivism in the normative sense that philosophers of science employ, rather I describe how scientists themselves use facts and predictions to support their theories. I find wide variations, and no support for the assumption that scientists use a single ‘Scientific Method’ in deciding whether to accept a proposed new theory. |
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Keywords: | Predictivism Novel predictions Accommodation Periodic law Periodic table Dmitri Mendeleev |
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