首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

公司控制人和审计人的博弈分析
引用本文:刘浩然. 公司控制人和审计人的博弈分析[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 2007, 41(12): 1969-1974
作者姓名:刘浩然
作者单位:深圳大学,经济学院,广东,518060
摘    要:以我国证券市场中大股东占用股份公司资金的现象为例,通过构建博弈模型,分析了股份公司控制人和审计人决策行为的特征和他们的相互关系,揭示了决策参数对博弈均衡策略的影响.通过模型分析,还就改善市场环境、发挥政府作用、提高审计监督效率等政策性问题进行了讨论,提出了针对性意见.

关 键 词:资金占用  审计监管  博弈
文章编号:1006-2467(2007)12-1969-06
收稿时间:2006-12-25
修稿时间:2006-12-25

The Game Analysis of the Relationship Between Controlling Shareholder and Auditor
LIU Hao-ran. The Game Analysis of the Relationship Between Controlling Shareholder and Auditor[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2007, 41(12): 1969-1974
Authors:LIU Hao-ran
Abstract:For researching the status of the controlling shareholder's embezzlement of company's funds in China,this paper analyzed about the strategy characters and the relationship between the proxy and auditor by designing a game model,and disclosed the influence of the key factors on the equilibrium strategy of the game.Based on the model analysis,this paper argued the issues about ameliorating the market environment,carrying forward the government function and improving the audit efficiency.
Keywords:embezzlement of funds  audit supervision  game
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号