转轨期对经营者监督的博弈分析

分析了股东“搭便车”行为 ,并结合我国转轨期的实际 ,指出“搭便车”导致内部监督不足和经营者侵害股东利益的现象严重 .针对这一问题 ,本文提出了两个解决途径 :一是鼓励法人股东持股以增加股权集中度 ,发挥大股东的作用 ,从而增加监督服务的供给 ;二是进一步完善市场监督机制和加强政府的监督力度

Gaming analysis of supervision on management in the transitional period

In this paper,we analyze the "free rider"behavior in the transitional period,then point out that this kind of behavior leads to the insufficiency of internal supervision and results in the phenomena of Manager violating Shareholders interests.We put forward two approaches to this problem as follows:one is to encourage Corporation Shareholders to hold more shares in order to concentrate shares,and make Big Shareholders play more important role so as to add supply of supervision,the other is to improve the supervision mechanism in market and to enhance the Govenments supervision on Managers in the transitional period.