| 集装箱班轮市场逆势造船的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨靳,李尧. 集装箱班轮市场逆势造船的博弈分析[J]. 集美大学学报(自然科学版), 2012, 0(6): 428-432 |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨靳 李尧 |
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| 作者单位： | (集美大学航海学院,福建 厦门 361021) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BJL007);厦门市科技计划项目(2011S0239) |
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| 摘 要： | 当前集装箱班轮运输市场处于极度萧条之中，集装箱班轮公司却逆势造船.采用完美信息静态博弈模型和完全信息静态模型分析上述经济现象，认为:寡头在追求市场份额时，造船是其占优策略；在短期内市场由萧条进入繁荣的概率必须大于50%以上，寡头才能获得短期利润，其利润期望值才大于零
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| 关 键 词： | 造船 博弈 完美信息静态博弈 |
Analysis on the Shipbuilding Game in a Poor Container Liner Market |
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| YANG Jin,LI Yao. Analysis on the Shipbuilding Game in a Poor Container Liner Market[J]. the Editorial Board of Jimei University(Natural Science), 2012, 0(6): 428-432 |
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| Authors: | YANG Jin LI Yao |
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| Affiliation: | (Navigation Institute,Jimei University,Xiamen 361021,China) |
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| Abstract: | The container liner shipping market has been gloomy since 2008,but liner operators have been building ships regardless.This article analyses the above economic situation using the static game model with perfect information and static model with complete information. The conclusions are that:shipbuilding is a favourable strategy when oligarchs pursue market shares; however, they can gain short-term profits only if there is higher than 50% probability that the market gloom will become boom in the short term |
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| Keywords: | shipbuilding game static game with perfect information |
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