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MCP机制下的发电商报价策略研究
引用本文:周建中,莫莉,吴玮,曹广晶. MCP机制下的发电商报价策略研究[J]. 华中科技大学学报(自然科学版), 2006, 34(1): 84-86
作者姓名:周建中  莫莉  吴玮  曹广晶
作者单位:1. 华中科技大学,水电与数字化工程学院,湖北,武汉,430074
2. 中国长江三峡工程开发总公司,湖北
摘    要:建立了一个考虑发电商的单位成本、最高报价、低于和等于市场出清价格(MCP)竞价成功的两种可能性概率的不完全信息模型.针对该模型,提出用预期市场出清电价和贝叶斯博弈结合的方法,求出以发电商收益最大为目标的报价策略,为电力市场内发电商的报价提供了一种新的分析途径.

关 键 词:发电商  预期市场出清价  贝叶斯博弈  报价策略
文章编号:1671-4512(2006)01-0084-03
收稿时间:2005-03-24
修稿时间:2005-03-24

Study of bidding strategies for generation companies in market clear price mechanism
Zhou Jianzhong,Mo Li,Wu Wei,Cao Guangjing. Study of bidding strategies for generation companies in market clear price mechanism[J]. JOURNAL OF HUAZHONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.NATURE SCIENCE, 2006, 34(1): 84-86
Authors:Zhou Jianzhong  Mo Li  Wu Wei  Cao Guangjing
Abstract:An incomplete information model considering the unit cost and the maximum bidding price of power generation companies,the probabilities of winning below or on the margin was built.Aiming at the model,the bidding strategies bosed on both expected MCP and Bayesian game theory were proposed.It provided maximizing profit of generation companies and an efficient way to the bidding strategy of the power generation companies in electricity market.
Keywords:generation companies  expected MCP  Bayesian game theory  bidding strategy
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