| 寡头垄断条件下的排污权交易博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖江文,赵勇,罗云峰,岳超源. 寡头垄断条件下的排污权交易博弈模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2003, 23(4): 27-31. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2003)4-27 |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖江文 赵勇 罗云峰 岳超源 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉华中科技大学系统工程研究所 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金 (60 0 740 3 3 )，中国高等学校博士点基金 (2 0 0 2 0 4870 46) |
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| 摘 要： | 建立了寡头垄断条件下的排污权交易博弈模型 ,分析了具有不同生产成本和治污成本的寡头企业在政府发放不同数量的许可证时的交易均衡 .证明了在特定情况下允许排污权交易并不一定有益 ,反而可能导致低产出率和高价格的市场均衡 ,并可能导致产品由低成本企业向高成本企业迁移 ,即高成本的企业反而生产更多
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| 关 键 词： | 寡头垄断 排污权交易 博弈论 Cournot模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2003)04-0027-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001-12-31 |
A Game Model of Tradable Emission Permits under Conditions of Duopoly |
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| XIAO Jiang-wen,ZHAO Yong,LUO Yun-feng,YUE Chao-yuan. A Game Model of Tradable Emission Permits under Conditions of Duopoly[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2003, 23(4): 27-31. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2003)4-27 |
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| Authors: | XIAO Jiang-wen ZHAO Yong LUO Yun-feng YUE Chao-yuan |
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| Affiliation: | Institute of Systems Eng, Huazhong University of Science and Technology |
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| Abstract: | A game model of tradable emission permits under conditions of duopoly is established based on the Cournot game model. The equilibrium is analyzed between firms which have different production cost and pollution controlling cost while given different amount of emission permits by governments. It is proved that in some special cases tradable emission permits will not result in much advantage, but equilibrium with low output capacity and high price. Besides, it may result in higher production of firms whose cost is higher, and lower productions of firms whose cost is lower. |
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| Keywords: | duopoly tradable emission permits game theory Cournot model |
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