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基于机制设计理论的企业技术委托开发道德风险防范研究
引用本文:曹兴,石中华.基于机制设计理论的企业技术委托开发道德风险防范研究[J].系统工程,2005,23(11):85-90.
作者姓名:曹兴  石中华
作者单位:中南大学,商学院,湖南,长沙,410083
摘    要:通过对技术委托开发委托代理关系特点的分析,在国内外学者研究成果的基础上通过激励机制设计了三阶段对策模型,建立了一个同时可以分析隐藏行动、隐藏信息道德风险的总体框架,在此基础上,运用米尔利斯-霍姆斯特姆模型方法对每种可能情况下.的最优合约特征进行了分析。

关 键 词:机制设计  技术委托开发  道德风险
文章编号:1001-4098(2005)11-0085-06
收稿时间:2005-07-22
修稿时间:2005-07-222005-10-18

On Moral Hazard Prevention of Commissioned Technological Development Based on Incentive Mechanism Design Theory
CAO Xing,SHI Zhong-hua.On Moral Hazard Prevention of Commissioned Technological Development Based on Incentive Mechanism Design Theory[J].Systems Engineering,2005,23(11):85-90.
Authors:CAO Xing  SHI Zhong-hua
Institution:School of Business,Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Abstract:Under the framework of three-stage reference model concerning mechanism design,the paper analyzes the moral hazard of R&D units in the course of commissioned technological development.Based on the research findings of both(domestic) and international scholars,and the analysis on the characters of the commissioned technology development,it comes up with some new assumptions and sets up a framework,which can analyze the moral hazard of hidden behavior and hidden information simultaneously.Based on the framework,it adopts Mirrlees-Holmstrom Approach to analyze the(features) of optical contract under each possible circumstance.
Keywords:Incentive Mechanism Design  Commissioned Technological Development  Moral Hazard
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