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多任务委托代理模型下缉查队伍的激励机制设计
引用本文:蒋珊珊.多任务委托代理模型下缉查队伍的激励机制设计[J].复旦学报(自然科学版),2009,48(3).
作者姓名:蒋珊珊
作者单位:复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433  
摘    要:探讨了Holmstrom-Milgrom 多任务委托代理模型在缉查队伍激励机制设计中的应用.从运筹学的角度证明了模型解的存在性,并将所求结果应用于稽查队伍的激励机制设计问题.结果表明:在现实情况下,稽查队伍会被现实所诱导,用更多的时间和精力去完成稽查任务,而较少地顾及信息化建设,最终使公司委托人的信息化建设工作失败.为防止对稽查队伍激励效能的弱化,提出了3种可能改进的方法.所得结果与实际观测到的事实相一致并且为决策者设计相关的激励机制提供了可行方案.

关 键 词:稽查队伍  多任务委托代理  激励机制

External Auditing Incentive System Design Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Model
JIANG Shan-shan.External Auditing Incentive System Design Based on Multi-task Principal-agent Model[J].Journal of Fudan University(Natural Science),2009,48(3).
Authors:JIANG Shan-shan
Institution:School of Management;Fudan University;Shanghai;200433;China
Abstract:The Holmstrom-Milgrom multi-task principal-agent model is applied in the external auditing staff's incentive system problem.The existence of the solution is proved from the operations research angle.The calculation result shows: In reality,the external auditing staff will pay meore attention to the auditing task other than information updating,which leads to the failure of the information construction.In the end,three methods are given to solve this problem.The solution's economic explanation is consistent ...
Keywords:external auditing  multi-task principal-agent  incentive system  
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