Do Newton’s rules of reasoning guarantee truth … must they? |
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Authors: | Quayshawn Spencer |
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Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy, Building 90, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305-2155, USA |
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Abstract: | Newton’s Principia introduces four rules of reasoning for natural philosophy. Although useful, there is a concern about whether Newton’s rules guarantee truth. After redirecting the discussion from truth to validity, I show that these rules are valid insofar as they fulfill Goodman’s criteria for inductive rules and Newton’s own methodological program of experimental philosophy; provided that cross-checks are used prior to applications of rule 4 and immediately after applications of rule 2 the following activities are pursued: (1) research addressing observations that systematically deviate from theoretical idealizations and (2) applications of theory that safeguard ongoing research from proceeding down a garden path. |
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Keywords: | Isaac Newton Principia Rules of Reasoning Nelson Goodman Induction |
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