环境治理中的道德风险与激励机制

不完全信息条件下，由于环境管理部门不能对排污企业有效监督，排污企业会隐瞒自己的排污行为，并在排污治理中出现偷懒行为．针对企业不同的风险态度，用委托-代理理论建立了相应的契约机制．在风险中性条件下，分析了有效的预算平衡契约是不存在的，并建立预算非平衡契约．如果企业对风险是充分厌恶的，则证明了有效的预算平衡契约是存在的，并且能够有效地激励企业遵守环境法规．

Moral Hazard and Incentive Mechanism in Sewage Disposal Control

With incomplete information, pollution control agency cannot efficiently monitor the emissions or abatement efforts by an individual polluter. The polluters will disguise their emissions and shirk on abatement effort. This paper used the theory of principal-agency to construct an effective contract in view of firms' different attitude to risk. Under risk neutral condition, an effective budget-balancing contract does not exit, and the paper constructed a non-budget-balancing contract. If the polluters are sufficiently risk averse, it is proved that a budget-balancing contract exits, which can effectively encourage polluters to abide by.