| 煤矿违规指挥中的进化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 张磊,沈玉志,高建兵.煤矿违规指挥中的进化博弈[J].辽宁工程技术大学学报(自然科学版),2011,30(1):40-43. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张磊 沈玉志 高建兵 |
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| 作者单位： | 辽宁工程技术大学,公共管理与法学院,辽宁,阜新,123000 |
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| 基金项目： | 辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目资助 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了解决在煤矿经营者违规指挥条件下生产者的执行策略选择问题,采用进化博弈的方法研究煤矿经营者在生产过程中的违规指挥,提出煤矿违规指挥下生产者种群的进化环境及进化博弈情形下经营者与生产者双方的策略调整方式,给出影响煤矿经营者指挥行为及工人是否选择执行的若干条件。结果表明:为了减少生产者对违规指挥的执行,应当限制煤矿经营者对生产者的生产奖励上界及经营者处罚下界。在煤矿中强化对生产者的安全教育,使之意识到生命安全的重要性,也是保障安全的一个关键措施。该成果对提高煤矿生成安全具有一定的参考价值和指导意义。
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| 关 键 词： | 煤矿生产 违规指挥 安全监察 进化博弈 |
Evolutionary game in illegal commanded coal production |
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| ZHANG Lei,SHEN Yuzhi,GAO Jianbing.Evolutionary game in illegal commanded coal production[J].Journal of Liaoning Technical University (Natural Science Edition),2011,30(1):40-43. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Lei SHEN Yuzhi GAO Jianbing |
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| Institution: | ZHANG Lei,SHEN Yuzhi,GAO Jianbing(College of Public Administration and Law Science,Liaoning Technical University,Fuxin 123000,China) |
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| Abstract: | In order to find producers' execution strategy selection for operators' illegal command in coal mine,the paper researched coal operators' illegal command in production process,developed the environment of producer stocks under this kind of illegal command and the Strategy Adjustment method of operators and producers,and gave the conditions that may affect the command behavior of operators and the behavior of producers.The result shows that,In order to reduce producers' execution to illegal command,the upper... |
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| Keywords: | coal production illegal command safety supervision evolutionary game |
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