参与方地位非对称条件下PPP项目风险分配的博弈模型

相对于现有的关于PPP项目风险分配的研究都是基于参与方地位对称的情形, 该文利用讨价还价博弈理论, 结合项目参与方地位非对称的现实情况, 分别构建了完全信息条件下和不完全信息条件下PPP项目风险分配的讨价还价博弈模型, 并分别得出了对应的子博弈精炼纳什均衡. 该文的研究成果不仅在理论上有益地补充了PPP 项目风险分配研究的不足, 而且对保障我国准公共项目的建设也具有非常重要的现实意义.

Game model for PPP project's risk allocation under the asymmetry condition of participant's position

Comparing to the current research on PPP project's risk allocation based on the symmetry of participants' status, this paper combines the realistic asymmetry of participants' status in the bargaining game theory to construct a bargaining game model for PPP project's risk allocation under the conditions of complete and incomplete information respectively. Through the analysis of the model, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is found as the corresponding solution. The findings of this paper not only supplement the research of the risk allocation of PPP project in the aspect of theory but also have great realistic significance in ensuring the construction of quasi-public project.