| 委托代理与国有企业经营者行为模式构建 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴昌南. 委托代理与国有企业经营者行为模式构建[J]. 韶关学院学报, 2001, 22(2): 11-15 |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴昌南 |
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| 作者单位： | 韶关学院旅游系, |
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| 摘 要： | 文章运用委托代理理论分析了国有企业与西方股份公司经营者行为差异，指出国有企业经营者激励与约束行为存在的主要问题是激励与约束的客体模糊、激励不相容和风险责任不对称等，并提出构建我国国有企业经营者激励与约束行为的有效模式应从两方面着手一是逐步创造公平竞争的市场环境，建立间接的激励与约束机制；二是创造直接的激励与约束机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理；经营者行为模式；激励与约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5348(2001)02-0011-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-05-11 |
The Principal-agent Theory and Construction of the Behavior Model of Managers in the State-owned Enterprises |
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| WU Chang-nan. The Principal-agent Theory and Construction of the Behavior Model of Managers in the State-owned Enterprises[J]. Journal of Shaoguan University(Social Science Edition), 2001, 22(2): 11-15 |
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| Authors: | WU Chang-nan |
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| Abstract: | Based on the analysis of the different behavior model of managers between Western joint stock companies and state owned enterprises,the author points out some problems,i.e.,objective obscurity of incentives and constraints,asymmetry of hazard and responsibility etc.existing in the state owned enterprises.To solve these problems we should construct a efficient behavior model of managers of the state owned enterprises from two sides;one is to construct a direct system of incentives and constraints;while the other is the indirect. |
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| Keywords: | the principal-agent theory behavior model of managers system of incentives and constraints |
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