Can the constructive empiricist be a nominalist? Quasi-truth, commitment and consistency |
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Authors: | Paul Dicken |
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Affiliation: | aDepartment of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I explore Rosen’s (1994) ‘transcendental’ objection to constructive empiricism—the argument that in order to be a constructive empiricist, one must be ontologically committed to just the sort of abstract, mathematical objects constructive empiricism seems committed to denying. In particular, I assess Bueno’s (1999) ‘partial structures’ response to Rosen, and argue that such a strategy cannot succeed, on the grounds that it cannot provide an adequate metalogic for our scientific discourse. I conclude by arguing that this result provides some interesting consequences in general for anti-realist programmes in the philosophy of science. |
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Keywords: | Constructive empiricism Mathematical fictionalism Partial structures Modality |
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