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双向搭便车行为下双渠道供应链统一定价和服务决策
引用本文:许明星,李雪琴.双向搭便车行为下双渠道供应链统一定价和服务决策[J].山东大学学报(理学版),2022,57(9):55-70.
作者姓名:许明星  李雪琴
作者单位:1.福建工程学院交通运输学院, 福建 福州 350118;2.中国科学院心理研究所行为科学重点实验室, 北京 100101
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(19YJC630194);福建省自然科学基金项目(2020J01902);福建省社科规划社科研究基地重大项目(FJ2020JDZ068)
摘    要:在由制造商经营线上渠道和零售商经营线下渠道且实施统一定价的双渠道供应链中,研究线上线下双向搭便车行为的最优统一定价和服务决策,并深入探讨搭便车行为对价格、服务水平和收益的影响。研究发现:(1)与线上线下不存在搭便车行为的情况相比,渠道间双向搭便车下的统一销售价格、服务水平和系统利润更高;(2)如果制造商掌握供应链主导权,统一销售价格和服务水平将随着服务搭便车程度的增加而增加;如果零售商掌握供应链主导权,统一销售价格和服务水平会随着线下渠道搭便车程度的增加而增加,但几乎不会受到线上渠道搭便车程度的影响;(3)在制造商主导供应链的情形下,线下渠道的搭便车行为可以增加制造商和零售商的利润,线上渠道的搭便车行为能增加制造商的利润,但会降低零售商的利润;在零售商主导供应链的情形下,制造商和零售商的利润都会因双渠道间的服务搭便车行为而增加。总体来看,双向搭便车行为对双渠道供应链有利,即供应链总利润将随着渠道间搭便车程度的增大而增加。

关 键 词:双向搭便车  双渠道供应链  统一定价  服务决策  

Unified pricing and service effort strategy in a dual-channel supply chain with bidirectional free-riding
XU Ming-xing,LI Xue-qin.Unified pricing and service effort strategy in a dual-channel supply chain with bidirectional free-riding[J].Journal of Shandong University,2022,57(9):55-70.
Authors:XU Ming-xing  LI Xue-qin
Institution:1. School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, Fujian, China;2. CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Beijing 100101, China
Abstract:Considering a dual-channel supply chain where the manufacturer operates the online channel and the traditional retailer operates the offline channel in the uniform price setting, to study the two members optimal unified pricing and service effort strategy with bidirectional free-riding, and investigate how free riding affects the two members pricing, service strategies and profits. The results show that(ⅰ)compared to the situation where there is no free-riding behavior between online and offline channels, the uniform price, service effort level and total profit of the dual channels with bidirectional free-riding are higher.(ⅱ)In the manufacturer-Stackelberg scenario, the uniform price and service effort level will increase with the increasement of the degree of free riding; in the retailer-Stackelberg scenario, the price and service level will increase with the increasement of the degree of offline free riding, but will hardly be affected by online free riding behavior.(ⅲ)If the manufacturer dominates the supply chain, offline free-riding behavior will increase the both members profits, while online free-riding behavior is only increasing the manufacturer profit but decreasing the retailer profit; if the retailer dominate the supply chain, the profits of both manufacturer and retailer can be enhanced by the free riding behavior between the two channels. In general, bidirectional free-riding behavior is beneficial to the dual-channel supply chain, that is, the total profit of the supply chain will increase with the increasement of the degree of free-riding between channels.
Keywords:bidirectional free-riding  dual-channel supply chain  unified pricing  service effort  
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