电子政务发展过程中政府与公务员的博弈分析

从经济学的角度分析了我国从传统政务向电子政务变迁过程中公务员的利益冲突和行为特点，井指出要顺利推行电子政务，必须设计有效的公务员激励机制．对此，建立了相应的博弈模型，分析了在信息对称、政府提供固定奖励以及信息不对称条件下政府对公务员的激励机制．

Game Analysis between Government and Office-Bearer in e-Government Development

From the viewpoint of economics, this paper analysed the benefit and behavior of office-bearer in the transition process from traditional government to e-government in China. The effective incentive mechanism for office-bearer should be designed in order to promote the e-government development. The game model for the problem was founded. The incentive mechanism under information symmetry, the fixed encouragement provided by government and information asymmetry was analyzed.