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允许收购竞争者时创新企业的最优策略
引用本文:霍沛军.允许收购竞争者时创新企业的最优策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,22(7):9-16.
作者姓名:霍沛军
作者单位:清华大学经济管理学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金 (70 0 710 16
摘    要:双寡头中有一个企业从事成本降低型研究与发展 (R&D) .创新企业可以在进行 R&D之前或之后收购另一企业 ,分别称为事前收购和事后收购 .本文首先对事前收购和事后收购两种策略进行对比分析 .结果表明 ,当 R&D溢出较大时创新企业将选择事前收购 ,而溢出较小时将选择事后收购 .值得注意的是 ,创新企业选择的收购策略同时也使消费者剩余和 R&D投资达到最大 .最后将事前和事后收购分别与不收购进行对比 .不收购总不是创新企业的最优策略 ,但在有些情况下 ,不收购时的 R&D投资和消费者剩余却是最大的.

关 键 词:研究与发展  收购  溢出  博弈分析    
文章编号:1000-6788(2002)07-0009-08
修稿时间:2001年9月6日

Optimal Policies of an Innovating Firm Permitted to Take over Its Competitor
HUO Pei\|jun.Optimal Policies of an Innovating Firm Permitted to Take over Its Competitor[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2002,22(7):9-16.
Authors:HUO Pei\|jun
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
Abstract:One firm conducts cost\|reducing R&D in a duopoly. The innovating firm may take over its rival either before or after the R&D activities are conducted. The corresponding takeover policies are called ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover, respectively. The first part of the paper makes a comparison between ex\|ante takeover and ex\|post takeover. It is shown that, the innovating firm chooses ex\|ante takeover for large spillover and ex\|post takeover for small spillover. It is remarkable that the takeover policy chosen by the innovating firm also maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus. The second part of the paper compares no takeover with ex\|post takeover and ex\|ante takeover, respectively. No takeover is never the innovating firm's optimal policy, but it maximizes R&D investment and consumer surplus under some cases.
Keywords:R&D  takeover  spillovers  game analyses
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