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再论医患关系博弈模型
引用本文:王勇,弓宪文,张红卫.再论医患关系博弈模型[J].重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2006,29(6):135-139.
作者姓名:王勇  弓宪文  张红卫
作者单位:重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030;重庆邮电大学校长办公室,重庆,400065
摘    要:信息高度不对称是医患关系的重要特征,信息不对称下医患关系博弈模型的分析表明,低质量的医院试图伪装成高质量的医院获取更多的报酬,患者的利益因此而受到损害,此时的均衡是低效率的.因此,应当通过建立医疗信息公开制度,加强医患信息交流等措施来缓解信息不对称状况;同时,还提出了医疗市场政府规制的相应措施。

关 键 词:信息不对称  医疗市场  医患关系  博弈
文章编号:1000-582X(2006)06-0135-05
收稿时间:2006-01-10
修稿时间:2006年1月10日

Game Model of Hospital-patient Relationship
WANG Yong,GONG Xian-wen,ZHONG Hong-wei.Game Model of Hospital-patient Relationship[J].Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition),2006,29(6):135-139.
Authors:WANG Yong  GONG Xian-wen  ZHONG Hong-wei
Institution:1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University , Chongqing,400030, China ;2. The President Office, Chongqing University of Posts and Tele communica dons, Chongqing,400065, China
Abstract:The hospital and patient are in the state of asymmetric information in the medical market. By developing game model, the authors analyze the game process and equilibrium between the hospital and patient under asymmetric information. The analyses demonstrate that asymmetric information can lead to low efficient equilibrium. Therefore, the hospital should set up medical information opening system and strengthen the communication between the hospital and the patient so as to relieve the situation of asymmetric information. Meanwhile, the paper puts forwad some measures about government regulation in medical marcket.
Keywords:asymmetric information  medical market  hospita-patient relationship  game
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