负债融资、大股东控制与企业过度投资行为

根据一些学者的研究,负债融资导致了股东与债权人的利益冲突,但同时负债融资对股东与经理人之间的冲突也具有相机治理作用;大股东控制一方面减少了股东与经理人之间的代理成本,另一方面大股东也可能为谋取私有收益而扭曲公司的投资行为.本文建立了一个负债融资对大股东过度投资行为的相机治理模型,并试图通过该模型来探讨负债融资对大股东控制公司投资行为与决策的影响机制.研究结果发现控股股东持股比例越高,因谋取私有收益而导致过度投资的趋势就越弱;负债融资能够抑制控股股东的过度投资行为,尤其是来自与控股股东具有很强谈判能力的债权人的融资,从而有效保护中小股东的利益.

In-debt Financing,Major Stockholder Control, and the Firms' Over-investment Behavior

According to some scholars' researches,debt financing has caused the shareholders' and creditors' benefit conflict,but at the same time is in-debt financing also to have the camera government function.On the one hand major stockholder control can reduce the agency cost of the shareholders and managers;on the other hand the major stockholders probably twist the investment behavior to seek the private gain.This article has established a model of in-debt financing to major stockholders' camera government,and attempts through this model to discuss in-debt financing to control the corporate investment behavior and the policy-making influence mechanism to the major stockholder.The paper holds that the higher proportion that control stockholders stocks,the weaker tendency of control stockholders seeking the private gain;In-debt financing can suppress control shareholders' over-investments,especially those that come from particular creditors' financing which has very strong negotiation ability with control shareholder,thus effectively could protect the small shareholders' benefits.