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关于产权明晰问题的探讨
引用本文:李少白,刘永清,吴宏鹏,童燕青.关于产权明晰问题的探讨[J].华南理工大学学报(自然科学版),2000,28(1):21-24.
作者姓名:李少白  刘永清  吴宏鹏  童燕青
作者单位:1. 华南理工大学,自动控制工程系,广东,广州,510640
2. 华南理工大学资产实验室管理处,广东,广州,510640
基金项目:国家国有资产管理局软科学基金,E9-108-047,
摘    要:本文研究产权明晰问题,提出了产权明晰的三个层次,即国家与公民和法人企业、投资者之间及其企业、企业与员工三个层次的产权明晰问题,国有企业现在的产权明晰主要是指第一和第二层次的产权明晰;在第三层次上的要素价格市场化才是产权明晰的关键;引入多元投资主体仅有助于明晰第三层次的产权;产权明晰是经济人利益主体之间的一个动态博弈工程。

关 键 词:国有企业  产权明晰  动态博弈  现代企业制度  中国
文章编号:1000-565X(2000)01-0021-04
修稿时间:1999-01-04

A Study on the Problem of Property Rights Distinction
LI Shao-bai,LIU Yong-qing,WU Hong-peng,TONG Yan-qing.A Study on the Problem of Property Rights Distinction[J].Journal of South China University of Technology(Natural Science Edition),2000,28(1):21-24.
Authors:LI Shao-bai  LIU Yong-qing  WU Hong-peng  TONG Yan-qing
Abstract:Proposed in this paper are the three levels of property rights distinction, namely that between the government and its citizens, that between the government and incorporated enterprises, and that between an enterprise and its employees. Property rights distinction for state-owned enterprises is mainly at the first two levels. The key to property rights distinction at the third level is the marketing of factor prices. Getting more than one investor in a state-owned enterprise is only helpful at the third level of distinction. Property rights distinction is a process of dynamic game among the economic persons with their own interests.
Keywords:state_owned enterprise  property rights  property rights distinction  dynamic game
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