| 基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的科技定密策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王志伟,乔晗,李自然,赵映雪.基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的科技定密策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(12):3182-3189. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王志伟 乔晗 李自然 赵映雪 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国科学院大学 管理学院, 北京 100190;2. 中国科学院 数学与系统科学研究院, 北京 100190;3. 中国科学院 预测科学研究中心, 北京 100190;4. 对外经济贸易大学 国际经济贸易学院, 北京 100029 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(71003057，71373262，71003094，71101028，71371052)；新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-13-0733) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文首次应用不完全信息动态博弈模型研究我国科技定密机制问题.研究结果表明：1)现有机制无法激励真实持密人申请定密，还会使虚假持密人通过申请定密而获益；2)补贴-惩罚机制可以在一定程度上改善现有机制，但是不能有效区分持密人的真实类型；3)第三方认证机制可有效区分科研成果的密级并促使高密级科研成果持有者主动申请定密.基于理论分析结果，本文提出改善我国科技定密工作的政策建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 科技定密 动态博弈 信息 激励机制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-05-31 |
Analysis on the strategies of science & technology secret-level setting based on dynamic games of incomplete information |
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| WANG Zhi-wei,QIAO Han,LI Zi-ran,ZHAO Ying-xue.Analysis on the strategies of science & technology secret-level setting based on dynamic games of incomplete information[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2013,33(12):3182-3189. |
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| Authors: | WANG Zhi-wei QIAO Han LI Zi-ran ZHAO Ying-xue |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;2. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;3. Center for Forecasting Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;4. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper attempts to analyze the secret-level setting mechanism of science and technology in China by using dynamic game models of incomplete information. The main results are: 1) under the current mechanism, real secret-owners are not willing to apply for secret-level setting while false secret-owners could benefit from the application; 2) the subsidy-punishment mechanism makes the current situation better but cannot distinguish real secret-owners from false secret-owners; 3) third party inspection mechanism could distinguish real secret-owners from false secret-owners efficiently and incent real secret-owners to apply for secret-level setting voluntarily. Based on the above results, some policy suggestions are made about secret-level setting mechanism of science and technology in China. |
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| Keywords: | secret-level setting of science and technology dynamic games information incentive mechanism |
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