| 考虑广告商信誉的搜索引擎排位拍卖的机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 汪定伟. 考虑广告商信誉的搜索引擎排位拍卖的机制设计[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2011, 31(1): 38-42. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2011)1-38 |
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| 作者姓名： | 汪定伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 东北大学 信息科学与工程学院,沈阳 110004 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70931001,70771021,60821063); 教育部博士点基金(200801450008) |
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| 摘 要： | 排位拍卖是通用搜索引擎营运商的主要赢利手段. 由于不良广告乘虚而入,排位拍卖过度趋利的拍卖机制受到了公众的广泛质疑.为规范搜索引擎营运行为,提出一种考虑广告商信誉的新的排位拍卖的机制.基于经典的VCG拍卖的机制提出了胜标的确定方法,推导并证明了各个广告排位的价格计算公式.通过与原有的不考虑广告商信誉的排位拍卖的收益对比说明,虽然在相同竞价水平上,考虑广告商信誉会给搜索引擎营运商带来少量的经济损失,但从长远看,搜索引擎的信誉提高带来访问量的增加,势必会给搜索引擎营运商带来更高的利润.
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| 关 键 词： | 网络拍卖 搜索引擎 拍卖模型 企业信誉 拍卖机制设计 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-09-04 |
Mechanism design of position auction with advertiser reputation for Web-search |
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| WANG Ding-wei. Mechanism design of position auction with advertiser reputation for Web-search[J]. Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice, 2011, 31(1): 38-42. DOI: 10.12011/1000-6788(2011)1-38 |
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| Authors: | WANG Ding-wei |
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| Affiliation: | School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110004, China |
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| Abstract: | Due to untrue advertisements appear in search results,the position auction mechanism with more attention on profit was criticized by public in China.To improve and normalize keyword search auction,we recommend a new position auction mechanism with consideration on advertiser reputations. Based on classical VCG auction,the winner determination approach is proposed.The computational formulas for all advertising slots are deduced and presented.Comparing with original position auction without reputations,the ne... |
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| Keywords: | Web-auction search engine auction model enterprise reputation auction mechanism design |
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