首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

越境污染问题的博弈分析
引用本文:王艳,叶淑红,丁德文. 越境污染问题的博弈分析[J]. 大连海事大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 31(3): 53-56
作者姓名:王艳  叶淑红  丁德文
作者单位:[1]大连海事大学环境科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116026 [2]大连轻工业学院信息科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116034 [3]大连轻工业学院生物与食品工程学院,辽宁大连116034
摘    要:造成越境污染的一个重要经济学原因是它属于国际外部性问题.运用博弈论方法对这一原因进行定量分析,明确了建立国际间环境合作联盟,制定联盟间合作协议对越境污染治理的必要性,强调加强环境联盟的监督控制和合作协议的实施力度对越境环境污染的外部性解决的促进作用,并进一步指出解决国际外部性问题过程中出现的现实困难.为解决越境环境污染问题,促使各国进行环境合作提供了理论上的依据.

关 键 词:越境环境污染  环境经济  博弈论  国际外部性
文章编号:1006-7736(2005)03-0053-04
收稿时间:2005-03-03
修稿时间:2005-03-03

Game''''s analysis on trans-boundary environmental pollution Problems
WANG Yan,YE Shu-hong,DING De-wen. Game''''s analysis on trans-boundary environmental pollution Problems[J]. Journal of Dalian Maritime University, 2005, 31(3): 53-56
Authors:WANG Yan  YE Shu-hong  DING De-wen
Abstract:An important economic reason for the trans-boundary environmental pollution was its international externality. Using game model, we analyzed the international externality quantitatively, one of the causes for trans-boundary environmental pollution problems, which made clear the necessity to set up international coalition and to put forward the cooperative agreements among nations. Furthermore, we emphasized that the strength of the regulation for coalitions and the implementation for agreements could enforce the trans- formation from externality to internality. Also, the difficulties during this transformation were pointed out. This paper provided a basis in theory for the trans-bourdarv environmental pollution problems.
Keywords:trans-boundary pollution   environmental economics   game theory    international externality
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号