首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

战略联盟伙伴选择的契约机制研究
引用本文:郭焱,张世英,郭彬,冷永刚.战略联盟伙伴选择的契约机制研究[J].系统工程学报,2004,19(5):477-481.
作者姓名:郭焱  张世英  郭彬  冷永刚
作者单位:1. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072;山东工商学院,山东,烟台,264005
2. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072
3. 山东工商学院,山东,烟台,264005
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70171001).
摘    要:研究了盟主在缺乏盟友的实际业务能力、服务成本等方面信息的情况下,利用博弈论显示原理设计不同的报酬合同来让盟友选择,从而根据盟友选择结果来判断其真实的能力或类型,避免了盟友逆向选择与道德风险问题的发生,通过分析,得出了最优报酬机制是由努力补偿金、风险补偿金和信息租金三部分组成。最优报酬机制的灵敏度与期望补偿正相关,与固定补偿负相关,有效的盟友比无效盟友工作更加努力,更乐于选择高强度激励、低固定补偿的合同和选用风险较小的项目。

关 键 词:战略联盟  伙伴选择  契约机制  逆向选择  道德风险
文章编号:1000-5781(2004)05-0477-05

Study of strategy on contract scheme for partner selection in strategic alliance
GUO Yan.Study of strategy on contract scheme for partner selection in strategic alliance[J].Journal of Systems Engineering,2004,19(5):477-481.
Authors:GUO Yan
Abstract:It is investigated that, with the absence of such information of alliance members to the sponsor as their real capability and their service cost and so forth, the sponsor uses revelation principle of the game theory to design different payment contracts to 1et alliance members select, and hence he can judge their true information in terms of their selecting result and avoid the problems of their adverse selection and moral hazard.The analysis shows that the optimal payment scheme consists of compensation for his effort, risk compensation and information rent, that the sensitivity of the optimal payment scheme is positively related to the expected compensation but negatively to the fixed compensation, and that the efficient alliance members work harder than the inefficient ones and tend to prefer to choose the high-powered incentives, the lower fixed_compensation contracts and some safer projects.
Keywords:strategic alliance  partner selection  adverse selection  moral hazard  contract scheme
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号