| 假冒伪劣商品的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 梁彤缨. 假冒伪劣商品的博弈分析[J]. 华南理工大学学报(自然科学版), 1997, 0(4): 42-45 |
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| 作者姓名： | 梁彤缨 |
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| 作者单位： | 华南理工大学工商管理学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文构造了一个厂商／消费者博弈模型，用于假冒伪劣商品问题的分析，得出丁两种情况下的纳什均衡，并在此基础上提出了建立高额赔偿金制度、降低消费者打假成本、加大反暴利力度等项治理假冒伪劣商品的政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 假冒伪劣商品 博弈 政策 |
A GAME ANALYSIS OF BASTARDS |
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| Liang Tongying. A GAME ANALYSIS OF BASTARDS[J]. Journal of South China University of Technology(Natural Science Edition), 1997, 0(4): 42-45 |
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| Authors: | Liang Tongying |
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| Abstract: | In this paper the author constructs a firm consumer game model,which is used to analyze bastards and from which a Nash equilibrium is deduced under two distinctive conditions.Based on this discussion the author makes the following suggestions:(a)A system of high compensation should be set up;(b) In combating bastards,the consumer cost should be decreased;(c) Anti profiteering should be strengthened. |
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| Keywords: | bastard game policy |
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