基于不完全信息动态博弈的P2P网络借贷行为研究

针对当前P2P行业的市场现状,构建了P2P网络借贷双方的不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了P2P平台承诺保障本金和不承诺保障本金两种情形下博弈双方以及平台自身的行为特点.结果表明:保本承诺使得信誉差的借款者倾向于借款、贷款者不加分辨选择贷款,同时平台的竞争力被削弱;若不承诺保本,平台可以在短期采取加强借款者资质审核、提高手续费、逾期惩罚、降低单笔列表限额等措施来驱逐信誉差的借款者;当前市场条件下借款者信誉良莠不齐,若短期措施实施不到位,市场效率低下,信誉良好的借款者和贷款者不能充分交易.本研究可为互联网金融监管部门监管政策的制定和P2P平台相关规则的设计提供一定的理论依据和参考.

Research on the behavior of Online Peer to Peer Lending Based on Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information

This paper constructs a model of dynamic game with incomplete informationabout the parties of the Online Peer to Peer Lending under the current market situation.We analyzed the behavior featwes both parties under the conditions of guaranteed commitment and no guaranteed commitment and found that:guaranteed commitment makes the borrowers with poor credit tend to borrow and lenders always tend to lend.At the same time the competitive of P2 Pplatform is weakened;If there is no guaranteed commitment,the platform could strengthen the examination of borrowers' qualification,increase fees,enhance punishment or lower the limits of a single borrow list to exclude those who cheated;In the current market conditions,the borrowers credibility varies greatly.If the short-term measures is not enough,the market efficiency is lowReputable borrowers and lenders cannot adequately trading.This paper provides a theoretical basis to the policy development of regulatory and the trading rules development of P2 Pplatforms.