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基于股民视角的上市公司再融资进化博弈分析
引用本文:李亮,刘高峰,黄丽琼.基于股民视角的上市公司再融资进化博弈分析[J].广西民族大学学报,2009(1).
作者姓名:李亮  刘高峰  黄丽琼
作者单位:西南交通大学经济管理学院;南宁百货大楼股份公司;
摘    要:首先,在BL模型和BS模型的基础上,提出一种全新的上市公司与股民之间的进化博弈模型;然后将进化博弈理论应用于分析再融资及其价值增值效应问题;最后通过对中国平安再融资的典型案例分析,说明了再融资对市场指数和公司收益的冲击效应。

关 键 词:上市公司  再融资  进化博弈  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public-listed Companies' Re-financing from the Perspective of Stock Investors
LI Liang,LIU Gao-feng,HUANG Li-qiong.Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public-listed Companies' Re-financing from the Perspective of Stock Investors[J].Journal of Guangxi University For Nationalities(Natural Science Edition),2009(1).
Authors:LI Liang  LIU Gao-feng  HUANG Li-qiong
Institution:Southwest Jiaotong University;Chengdu 610031;China;Nanning Department Store Co.Ltd.;Nanning 530012;China
Abstract:Basing on BL Model and BS Model,the paper puts forward a new evolutionary game analysis model related to public-listed companies and stock investors.Then the authors apply the evolutionary game theory to the analysis of re-financing and value-added effect.Finally,through the case analysis on the re-financing by China Ping An Insurance Co.Ltd.,the authors explain the striking impact of re-financing on market index and corporate earnings.
Keywords:public-listed company  re-financing  evolutionary game  
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