民营金字塔结构下控制性少数股东隧道效应研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

在对控制性少数股东做出清晰界定的基础上,运用我国民营上市公司的非平衡面板数据,考察了民营金字塔结构下控制性少数股东剥夺外部股东的隧道效应.结果表明:在保证控制权的情况下,控制性少数股东所持有的现金流权越小,其隧道挖掘越严重;处于金字塔底层的公司资产利润率越低,控制性少数股东越倾向于对其进行隧道挖掘;投资者保护越差,越有利于控制性少数股东的隧道挖掘.相反,在投资者保护较好的企业,即使控股股东的现金流权较小,即使其资产收益率较低,也不会发生严重的掏空行为.

The Tunneling Effects of Controlling Minority Shareholder under Private Pyramid Structure-Empirical Evidences from China

Based on the clearly defining of controlling minority shareholder,this paper analyzes the tunneling effects of controlling minority shareholder under private pyramid structure using the unbalanced panel data of Chinese private listed firms.The results indicate that the smaller the cash-flow right owned by controlling minority shareholder or the lower the ROA of the under layer firm or the worse the protection of investors,the more severely the tunneling to outside shareholder.Even if the smaller cash flow right or the lower ROA,the controlling minority shareholder will not made severely tunneling when the firm is in better investors legal protection environment.