| 线性市场上不同规模两公司选址博弈问题的Stackelberg 平衡 |
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| 引用本文： | 魏颢.线性市场上不同规模两公司选址博弈问题的Stackelberg 平衡[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006,26(2):77-82. |
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| 作者姓名： | 魏颢 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学数学科学系,北京,100084 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究不同规模两公司在一维有限线性市场上的选址博弈问题.首先修改HOTELLING原始模型的“费用函数”假设,建立不同规模两公司的选址博弈模型;然后介绍了一家大型公司投入一家店、另一家小型公司投入多家连锁店的竞争系统;通过应用该选址博弈模型,解得该系统的一个STACKELBERG平衡解:大公司的店在市场中央,小公司的店按“无缝配置”依次对称分布于市场两侧;最后,在平衡的前提下,讨论连锁小公司和大公司选址博弈时应采取的策略.
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| 关 键 词： | 选址博弈 Hotelling模型 Stackbelberg平衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-6788(2006)02-0077-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年11月11 |
A Stackelberg Equilibrium for a Location Game between a Large-Scale Firm and a Small-Scale Firm in Linear Market |
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| WEI Hao.A Stackelberg Equilibrium for a Location Game between a Large-Scale Firm and a Small-Scale Firm in Linear Market[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2006,26(2):77-82. |
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| Authors: | WEI Hao |
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| Abstract: | This paper presents a location game between a large firm and a small firm in a linear market.Firstly,the model of location game between different-scale 2-firms is set up by adapting the assumption of cost function in Hotelling model.Secondly,the competitive system is introduced,in which one store belongs to a large firm and the others belong to a small firm.Thirdly,the stackelberg equillibrium of this system,the large firm's store is located in the center of market and the small firm gathers its stores at the ends of market symmetrically,is solved as the solution of new model.Finally,several strategic decisions of a small firm which games with a large firm are given under the Stackelberg equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | location game hotelling model stackelberg equilibrium |
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