联合体工程总承包项目优化收益分配谈判模型

工程总承包为项目优化创造了条件,对联合体工程总承包项目而言,优化收益的分配关系到总承包优势能否得以充分发挥.针对设计施工联合体工程总承包项目优化收益分配问题,基于收益共享原则,将谈判机制引入优化收益分配中,考虑设计方及施工方公平关切行为,构建了优化收益分配谈判模型.设置仅设计方具有公平关切、仅施工方具有公平关切及双方均具有公平关切行为3种情景,通过模拟谈判实验,进一步分析了主体公平关切行为对谈判达成时的谈判周期、收益分配系数、优化净收益及双方各自可获得的优化净收益的影响.研究结果表明:谈判是一种可有效解决联合体工程总承包项目优化收益分配问题的方法;双方适度的公平关切行为对提高其自身收益有益,但过高的公平关切行为会导致谈判周期增加,不利于优化事项的达成.

Negotiation model of union general contracting project optimization profit distribution

Engineering general contracting creates the conditions for project optimization. For the union general contracting project, optimization profit distribution relates to the general contracting advantage whether can be fully achieved. Based on the principle of revenue-sharing, the negotiation mechanism is introduced into the project optimization profit distribution of design-construction union engineering general contract. Considering fairness preference of the designer and the contractor, build the negotiation model of project optimization profit distribution. Afterwards, this paper set three experiment scenarios: only the designer or the owner has fairness preference, and both two sides have fairness preference. Through negotiation simulated experiment, we analyzed the effects of the fairness preference of both two sides on the negotiation cycle, the coefficient of profit distribution, the optimization revenue and the net income of both sides. Result shows that: negotiation can effectively solve the problem of the profit distribution of union general contracting project optimization. In addition, the appropriate behavior of fairness preference by the two sides is beneficial to improve their own benefit. However, the designer and the contractor focus too much on fairness preference will increase the negotiation cycle and it is not conducive to the achievement of the optimization.